About GPSPATRON

GNSS jamming and spoofing detection, monitoring and simulation — engineered in Europe since 2018.

GPSPATRON designs systems that detect, classify and locate GNSS interference, and the simulators used to test GNSS resilience. From our headquarters in Warsaw, Poland, we combine our own detectors, the GP-Cloud analytics platform and simulation software to protect critical navigation and timing infrastructure.

Our Story

GPSPATRON was founded in 2018 in Vilnius, Lithuania, as a project of UAB Patrotesta by Maksim Barodzka, a serial technology entrepreneur with a background in real-time monitoring, satellite navigation, complex hardware and software engineering, and bringing new technologies to market.

The idea behind GPSPATRON came from a client’s question: Could their time servers and navigation receivers be protected against GNSS spoofing and jamming? The problem arose from anti-drone systems deployed to protect critical infrastructure. These systems used GNSS jamming and spoofing to counter drones, but in doing so, they could also disrupt the navigation and timing equipment of the very facilities they were designed to protect. At the time, the drone industry was growing rapidly, driving equally rapid development and deployment of counter-drone technologies. We recognised that GNSS interference was not a temporary problem. As these technologies spread, the risk to GNSS-dependent infrastructure would only increase.

We began with scientific research. While there was extensive theoretical literature on GNSS spoofing, we found surprisingly little experimental data showing how real receivers behaved under different attack scenarios. To close this gap, we developed our own GNSS spoofing simulator, allowing us to reproduce controlled attacks, test real navigation receivers and timing equipment, and build datasets covering different types and stages of spoofing. This hands-on research became the foundation of our detection technology.

From the beginning, we made a fundamental engineering decision: not to build our detection technology around the limitations of off-the-shelf GNSS receivers. Spoofing and anti-spoofing evolve much like viruses and antivirus software. Every new defence can lead to a more sophisticated attack. We therefore needed an architecture capable of collecting sufficiently detailed signal measurements to support new detection algorithms as threats evolved. We chose a three-channel design that analyses the spatial characteristics of individual satellite signals. In 2018, coherent spoofing was still largely a subject of scientific research, yet this early design decision is what enables our GP-Probe TGE2 to detect such sophisticated attacks today.

Over the following years, we continuously refined both the hardware and detection algorithms through laboratory experiments and real-world deployments. Building on this foundation, we expanded our product portfolio with the compact GP-Probe DIN L1 for large-scale monitoring networks and the portable GP-Probe Nano L1 for field operations and interference investigations.

In 2020, as the project’s commercial potential became clear, we registered the GPSPATRON trademark. In 2022, we relocated our headquarters to Warsaw, Poland, and established GPSPATRON Sp. z o.o., which has since served as our main office and engineering base. Today, our technology is used by more than 50 organisations across over 20 countries.

Why GPSPATRON

Our Technology Journey

Since day one our development has followed one loop: collect real interference data, improve the algorithms, then test them against stronger attacks.

2018

Starting with research

We started with research. We studied the scientific literature on GNSS spoofing, built our own GPS spoofer and generated different types of attacks to see how real receivers respond.

Two conclusions set our direction. First, coherent spoofing is the most dangerous attack. At its onset the counterfeit signals are synchronised with the genuine ones in code delay, Doppler frequency and navigation data, so precisely that the receiver’s tracking loops never lose lock. Any civil GNSS receiver is vulnerable to it, and once the signals are captured the attacker can gradually drag the position and time solution away.

At the receiver level such signals are indistinguishable from real ones. What gives them away is their spatial signature: genuine signals arrive from satellites spread across the sky, while counterfeit ones come from one or a few terrestrial transmitters. Measuring this requires several spatially separated antennas.

Second, detection has to be fast. Once a receiver has locked onto counterfeit signals, its time and position are already compromised, so the alarm must come before the capture is complete.

Only then did we build the first prototypes of our monitoring solution, completed in October. From the first experiments we recorded every attack and interference event into an internal dataset.

2019

Controlled attacks and the first algorithms

To develop detection, we needed attacks we could control and repeat. In February we released GP-Simulator, software that generates counterfeit GPS signals synchronised with the real satellites, including coordinated attacks from several transmitters.

We staged attacks on GNSS receivers and precision time servers, published the results as open vulnerability reports and added every recording to our dataset. On this data we began developing detection and classification algorithms for the most difficult scenarios, designed to raise the alarm before the target receiver is captured.

2020–2021

A detector built for spatial analysis

We introduced GP-Probe TGE2, the second generation of our three-channel detector. By comparing the signal received on three separate antennas, it recognises coherent spoofing that looks normal to a single receiver. We also extended our tests to multi-band, RTK and timing receivers and to multi-constellation attacks.

In 2021 we showed why speed matters: in our tests a receiver’s time output was corrupted about 15 seconds after a spoofing attack began, while our system raised the alarm in under 3 seconds.

2022

The first independent field test

In April and May we published a GP-Simulator video series that explains spoofing scenarios and time manipulation step by step.

In September we took part in JammerTest 2022 in Andøya, Norway, an annual event where Norwegian authorities transmit real jamming and spoofing signals under controlled conditions. Four GP-Probes streamed live data to GP-Cloud, giving us our first large set of recordings from real transmitters.

2023

Fewer false alarms

The 2022 data showed that some types of jamming could be mistaken for spoofing. We reworked our classification algorithms on that data and verified them at JammerTest 2023, where the system also recovered tracking of genuine signals after every spoofing attack without outside help.

We also field-tested pre-production units of GP-Probe DIN L1, a compact detector for large networks, and an outdoor configuration of TGE2. In October, GP-Probe TGE2 passed EMC and FCC testing in an accredited laboratory.

2024

98.3% at JammerTest

In April we launched GP-Probe DIN L1, which detects interference on its own or as part of a GP-Cloud network and monitors timing (PPS) accuracy. In June we added the IP66 GP-Probe Box for permanent outdoor TGE2 installations.

At JammerTest 2024 the system detected interference in all 60 test scenarios, on average within 0.6 seconds, and correctly classified jamming or spoofing in 59 of them (98.3%). From June to November we ran six months of continuous monitoring on the Baltic coast with Gdynia Maritime University: our first long-term dataset from a region under persistent interference. In October, GP-Jammer, our multi-channel interference simulator, entered closed beta.

2025

From the coast to the open sea

In February we published the Baltic Sea study: 84 hours of interference over six months, with strong indications of mobile sources at sea. Coverage by GPS World and maritime industry media brought it to an international audience.

From June to October we installed GP-Probe TGE2 on a research vessel in the southern Baltic. It recorded GPS spoofing combined with jamming of the other satellite systems, a pattern the coastal study had not seen (GPS World report). Building on this work, in November we released Vessel algorithms for interference detection on moving ships.

The portfolio grew as well. GP-Simulator 2 (May) tests GNSS receivers and their resilience to spoofing. GP-Probe Nano L1 is a wearable jamming detector for field teams, joined in November by the GPSPATRON Connect Android app; in December it passed CE, FCC and RCM compliance testing.

2026

A monitoring network across Europe

In January, TGE2 firmware 2.1.0 added local spectrum analysis that works without a cloud connection, and a new status that separates harmless RF signals from real jamming. In September our network recorded a space-based interference event that hit GPS and Galileo at the same moment from Poland to the United Kingdom: an event only a wide network of sensors can see.

Today and next

Every detector we deploy and every field campaign we run adds to a dataset that has grown continuously since 2018. We use it to refine classification, reduce false alarms and develop algorithms for new environments, from airports and ports to vessels and timing networks. Our engineering work continues on new detectors, firmware and GP-Cloud capabilities.

Our Portfolio

One ecosystem covers detection, monitoring, investigation and resilience testing, from a single portable detector to a national monitoring network.

Detection and Monitoring

GNSS Radio Probe for Time & Frequency Reference System Protection

GP-Probe TGE2

Three-channel flagship detector: spatial spoofing detection, interference classification and TDOA source localisation.

GP-Probe DIN L1 - GNSS L1 sensor for interference monitoring

GP-Probe DIN L1

Compact L1 detector for large deployments, with PPS monitoring and standalone or GP-Cloud operation.

GP-Probe Nano L1

Wearable jamming detector and logger for field teams, paired with the GPSPATRON Connect Android app.

Stay Ahead of GNSS Threats with One Comprehensive Solution

GP-Cloud

Central platform that correlates data from every detector, classifies events and keeps the evidence for investigation.

Simulation and Testing

GP-Simulator 2

Software-defined GPS simulator for receiver validation, spoofing scenarios and timing tests.

GP-Jammer

Multi-channel SDR software for controlled RF interference scenarios in the lab.

Trusted Worldwide

More than 50 organisations in over 20 countries use GPSPATRON technology: telecom regulators, police and defence organisations, aviation, maritime and research institutions.

POLAND
POLAND
Office of Electronic Communications
FRANCE
FRANCE
Airbus
NETHERLANDS
NETHERLANDS
Boskalis Group
QATAR
QATAR
Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA)
POLAND
POLAND
Main Office of Geodesy and Cartography of Poland
INDIA
INDIA
Ministry of Defence
DENMARK
DENMARK
Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S
HUNGARY
HUNGARY
National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH)
POLAND
POLAND
Polish National Police
SWEDEN
SWEDEN
The Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS)
SWEDEN
SWEDEN
Swedish Naval Forces
ESTONIA
ESTONIA
Tarbijakaitse ja Tehnilise Järelevalve Amet (TTJA)

Global Partner Network

Connect with our authorised partners and system integrators worldwide to find the right GPSPATRON solution for your needs.

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Location

GPSPATRON Sp. z o.o.  |  20 Prosta str  |  Warsaw  |  00-850  |  Poland

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